Why Lim’s Proposal Undermines the Concept of ASEAN Cooperation
Lim Guan Eng’s statement urging Indonesia to compensate Malaysia for the impact of transboundary haze or allow the establishment of a regional firefighting force with the authority to enter Indonesian forest areas reflects a problematic understanding of contemporary interstate relations. Lim raises a legitimate concern. Transboundary haze has affected public health, economic activities, education, and the daily lives of people across several Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia cannot disregard these consequences. However, the more fundamental question is why his proposed solutions revert to compensation and pressure on national sovereignty, when the underlying causes increasingly involve environmental governance, corporate interests, and cross-border investment networks.
In contemporary international relations, ecological disasters can no longer be understood rigidly as purely domestic matters confined within the territorial boundaries of individual states. Environmental degradation, climate change, forest fires, air pollution, and public health crises have transboundary characteristics. Their consequences do not follow national borders. Addressing them therefore requires a regional approach that goes beyond traditional diplomacy based on bilateral relations and demands for financial compensation.
Recognizing the transboundary nature of such disasters, however, does not mean that national sovereignty should be disregarded. Modern regionalism requires states to manage shared interests through institutions, policy coordination, information exchange, and mutually agreed accountability mechanisms. In other words, sovereignty need not become an obstacle to cooperation, but neither should it be used to legitimise unilateral actions by other states.
Moving Beyond the Logic of Compensation and Coercion
Lim Guan Eng’s proposal essentially presents Indonesia with two options: pay compensation for Malaysia’s losses or grant a regional firefighting force access to Indonesian forest areas to conduct operations. Both options reflect an approach that is transactional and potentially coercive. A complex ecological problem is treated as though it could be resolved through a financial payment or by granting foreign actors operational authority.
This approach overlooks far more fundamental questions: who benefits economically from activities that increase fire risks? Who controls the concessions? Who provides the financing? Who manages the supply chains? And who should be held accountable when environmental damage occurs?
Compensation can certainly serve as a legal instrument for remedying losses when liability and causation have been established. However, making financial compensation the primary solution without first identifying the responsible actors and the mechanisms that caused the damage fails to address the root of the problem. The state should not be the only party bearing responsibility for damage that may involve corporations, concession holders, investors, and transnational business networks.
Even more problematic is the proposal to establish a regional force with the authority to enter Indonesian forest areas. International firefighting assistance should certainly be welcomed and strengthened when Indonesia requires it. However, assistance provided with the consent of the receiving state is fundamentally different from granting foreign forces the authority to enter another country’s territory. The former constitutes regional cooperation, while the latter risks establishing a precedent for intervention in national jurisdiction.
Regional solutions should not be built on ultimatums. If every transboundary problem is addressed through threats of compensation or demands for unilateral access, ASEAN will move further away from institutional cooperation and return to a politics of interstate coercion. In this respect, Lim’s approach resembles a logic of compulsion rather than mature regional diplomacy.
Why Corporate Accountability Must Be at the Centre of the Debate
An important dimension largely overlooked in Lim’s argument is the involvement of corporations and transnational capital networks in regional land and forest governance. Forest and land fires cannot be explained solely through relations between the Indonesian government and neighboring countries affected by haze. Plantation activities, forestry industries, land clearing, peatland management, and commodity supply chains must also form a central part of the analysis.
A report released by Greenpeace Indonesia and Greenpeace Malaysia in November 2026 identified 17,390 smoke-source hotspots in Indonesia between 8 August and 31 October 2026. Of these, 1,776 hotspots were detected within 46 oil palm plantation concessions, while another 2,586 were located within 28 industrial timber plantation concessions. The report also identified more than 40 palm oil and forestry companies with links to companies or business groups in Singapore and Malaysia.
These findings do not, by themselves, prove that every company identified engaged in burning or bears legal responsibility for the fires. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that the haze problem has a corporate and cross-border investment dimension that cannot be ignored. The relationships between concession ownership, investment, financing, and supply chains must be examined transparently to ensure that accountability does not stop at the jurisdictional boundaries of the country where the fires occur.
This is where a fundamental weakness in Lim’s approach becomes apparent. He demands that Indonesia compensate Malaysia for its losses, but fails to place corporate responsibility and transnational business networks at the center of the proposed solution. Yet, if companies operating in or benefiting from land use in Indonesia have ownership, financing, or supply-chain links with entities in Malaysia and Singapore, the governments of those countries also have a role to play in ensuring that companies under their respective jurisdictions fulfil their environmental responsibilities.
Environmental accountability should not stop at the borders of the country where the damage occurs. It should follow the structures of ownership, financing, corporate control, and supply chains that enable such economic activities to take place. Corporations should not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of cross-border operations while evading accountability when their activities generate ecological risks.
